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The banking system has played a key role in balance-of-payments 
crises in a number of emerging countries. This article reviews three types 
of models which analyse the different factors involved in recent foreign-
exchange crises. These usually stem at least partly from balance-of-
payments problems; financial vulnerability causes the currency to collapse 
and undermines the banking system, thus generating a vicious circle. This 
paper shows that financial stability is by no means guaranteed, particularly 
in a globalized financial system. Emerging countries have to strike a balance 
between economic and financial stabilization, while maintaining their share 
of new capital flows. Although a difficult task, this is essential for avoiding 
a repeat of past crisis episodes, the threat of which apparently cannot 
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The rapid pace of fi nancial and institutional innovation 
over the last few years has seen markets become 
internationalized and gradually deregulated. This 
aspect of globalization entails considerable risks; and, 
while balance-of-payments crises are nothing new, 
international fi nancial instability has made them more 
frequent. This has elicited an outpouring of specialist 
articles that seek to identify the causes of foreign-
exchange crises and thus avoid their effects through 
early detection. 
This article outlines the way economic theory 
explains the phenomenon of foreign-exchange crises 
and how such explanations fi t reality, focusing on crises 
that have occurred over the last decade. A bibliographic 
and empirical summary is also made of the role played 
by the banking system in the unfolding of such crises, 
relating the analysis to different generations of balance-
of-payments crisis models. 
As current theory is better at explaining foreign-
exchange and financial-market problems, but does 
not clearly describe their gestation process, we try to 
make up for this failing by reviewing recent worldwide 
experience, and elucidating the feedback process that 
occurs between balance-of-payments and banking 
problems, using the tools and theoretical concepts of 
the economics of information.
A crisis can be defi ned as a moment of breakdown 
in the functioning of the system, involving a qualitative 
change in a positive or negative direction (Bobbio, 
Matteucci and Pasquino, 1998, p.139). As such, this 
paper views a foreign-exchange crisis as posing a major 
problem for a country’s monetary authority, by making 
it potentially impossible to defend a given exchange 
rate or an explicit exchange-rate regime. In either case, 
the onset of crisis means that the speculative attack 
was successful in forcing the exchange rate into a 
sharp and severe depreciation. A banking crisis, on the 
other hand, is defi ned as a lengthy deterioration in the 
quality of banking assets which raises the likelihood 
of a suspension of payments by fi nancial entities and 
forces the government or the central bank to announce 
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the Mexican crisis of 1982
First-generation models viewed balance-of-payments 
crises as arising from lax fi scal and monetary policies 
that were inconsistent with the fi xed exchange rate, 
thereby creating incentives for speculative attack, 
given the prospect of an exchange-rate collapse. 
Accordingly, this was seen as the exclusive responsibility 
of governments that implemented expansionary 
economic policies and accumulated public debt 
which they eventually monetized. This perception of 
foreign-exchange crises was encouraging, because, 
if macroeconomic imbalances could be detected 
relatively easily, the current models could predict them. 
Speculative attacks could be anticipated; there was no 
uncertainty about the time and intensity of the attack; 
and exogenous shocks were not taken into account. 
According to this line of thinking, crises only 
occurred when the private sector perceived government 
behaviour to be inconsistent with its commitment to 
the current exchange-rate regime. As the government’s 
role seemed to be static and did not respond to private-
sector actions, it was therefore suffi cient to calculate the 
optimal economic-policy response to prevent a crisis. 
The banking sector did not participate in the gestation of 
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the crisis, but subsequently faced diffi culties as a result 
of problems in the foreign-exchange market. The fi rst of 
this class of models was developed by Krugman (1979), 
inspired by the work of Salant and Henderson (1978). 
Subsequently Flood and Garber (1984), Connolly and 
Taylor (1984), Sachs (1986) and Van Wijnbergen (1988) 
expanded on the original version.
In some of these models, domestic credit expansion 
causes a reduction in international reserves leading to a 
speculative attack on the local currency that forces the 
current exchange rate to be abandoned. The balance-
of-payments crisis was associated with large-scale 
movements and specifi cally with the current account 
defi cits recorded in the period leading up to the crisis. 
The pioneering article in this school of thought was 
Krugman (1979), which analyses the case of a small 
open economy producing a single good. Prices and 
wages are fl exible, and production is at its potential 
level. The trade balance B is equivalent to the current 
account, with no distinction made between goods, 
services or transfers: the difference between output, 
Y, and expenditure is defi ned as:
 B=Y-G–C (1) 
In the fi nancial assets market, investors can choose 
between assets denominated in local currency, M, or 
in foreign currency, F, with the nominal interest rate 
on both types of asset set at zero. The real wealth of 
national residents, W, will thus be equal to the sum 
of their holdings in local currency, M, and foreign 
currency F:
 W=M/P+F (2)
The portfolio equilibrium condition establishes 
that holdings of monetary assets depend on the 
expected rate of infl ation, ∏. As the level of domestic 
prices P corresponds to the exchange rate, s, local-
currency asset holdings depend on the expected rate 
of depreciation of the currency:
 M/P=L(∏)*W (3)
where ∏ is the expected infl ation rate and thus the 
expected rate of depreciation of the local currency. 
Under a fl exible-exchange-rate regime, an increase 
in expected infl ation produces a rise in the level of 
domestic prices; whereas, with a fi xed exchange rate, 
an increase in expected infl ation alters the composition 
of residents’ wealth in favour of foreign-currency-
denominated assets. This causes an offsetting change 
in international reserves, R, which decrease by the 
same amount as private residents’ foreign-currency 
asset holdings increase.
Krugman (1979) also analyses the dynamic 
behaviour of the economy under both regimes. Under 
a fl exible exchange-rate regime, money supply growth 
is determined by the difference between public 
expenditure, G, and public income, T:
Under a fi xed exchange-rate scheme, the price level, 
P, is constant, because P=sP*, P*=1 and so P=s=∏. The 
private sector can only acquire assets by saving:
 S=Y-T-C(Y-T,W) (4)
In this case, and given that the price level is 
constant, the growth of wealth among local agents is 
equivalent to private sector saving:
 W=(M/P)+F=S (5)
If the wealth of national residents increases, a 
proportion of this, L, will be held in local currency 
(M/P=L(∏ )*W), while the remaining 1-L will be 
held in foreign-currency-denominated assets. The 
Government can fund its defi cit either by issuing money 
or by drawing down its international reserves, R. Hence 
the Government’s budget constraint, assuming it adjusts 
its expenditure to represent a fi xed proportion, g, of 
real money balances, can be written as:
 M/P+R=G–T=g(M/P) (6)
Thus, as long as the government has to underwrite 
a fi xed parity, it has no way to fi nance its defi cit. If it 
runs a defi cit, fi xing the exchange rate is impossible, 
whatever the initial level of international reserves, and 
the derived effect of setting the exchange rate will 
trigger a balance-of-payments crisis. 
First-generation models refl ected the nature of 
various foreign-exchange crises that occurred in the 
1970s and 1980s, e.g. in Argentina, Thailand, Ghana 
and Mexico, all of which stemmed originally from the 
monetization of public-sector defi cits. Contemporary 
crises such as in Chile or the Philippines, however, 
were already revealing the existence of other factors of 
vulnerability independent of government policy.
The ideological current underlying fi rst-generation 
models, which ignored certain constituents of the 
foreign-exchange crises of that period, such as real-
exchange-rate depreciation, was reinforced by the 
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so-called “Lawson Law”, which argued that a current 
account defi cit would not have negative consequences 
unless it arose from fi scal imbalance (Cline, 1995). 
Nonetheless, even under this scenario, the fi nancial 
sector could not isolate itself from a foreign-exchange 
crisis. A surplus or shortage of liquidity, and interest-
rate fl uctuations resulting from the monetary policy 
applied (particularly arising from the monetization of 
public-sector defi cits), compounded by the crowding 
out generated by government overborrowing, caused 
problems for the banking system which eventually fed 
through into the foreign-exchange market.
These conditions were clearly visible in the 
Mexican crisis of 1982, which is considered empirical 
evidence supporting this fi rst wave of models. The 
1976 peso devaluation caused major distortions in 
borrowing and lending operations in the banking 
system. The key factors underlying the process of 
fi nancial “disintermediation”, were the abandonment 
of the fi xed exchange-rate and price stability, intensive 
speculation, and a new economic model that involved 
an increase in public expenditure. Banks gradually 
became the fi nancial agents of the government. When 
bank credit fi nally dried up, the government resorted to 
printing money, and subsequently external borrowing 
(Tello, 1984).
In that period, real interest rates were negative, 
which, in conjunction with growing uncertainty on 
fi nancial markets, led to a domestic saving contraction. 
The economic model of the 1970s fi nally collapsed in 
1982. Infl ation, excessive public-sector borrowing, and 
its break with the private sector ended up seriously 
undermining the banking system, the current account 
and employment. The government took over the banks, 
blaming them for the fi nancial collapse (Rubio, 1999). 
As a result, the neutrality of the banking system in 
the foreign-exchange crises explained by these early 
models was by no means clear (Edwards, 2001).
III
Second-generation models:
the collapse of the European Monetary System 
and the 1994 Mexican crisis
The crisis of the European Monetary System (1992-
1993) revealed a new set of foreign-exchange-crisis 
triggers and, in conjunction with the Mexican crisis 
(1994-1995), gave rise to second-generation models. 
These analysed the destabilizing effects of globalization 
and fi nancial liberalization in greater depth.
The European Economic Community (EEC) had 
created the European Monetary System (EMS) to 
smooth out fl uctuations between its member currencies, 
with a view to future entry into the future European 
Monetary Union (EMU). Under this scheme, countries 
had to keep their currency in a fl otation band of +/-
2.25% centred on the target value of other member 
countries, except for the Italian lira which was allowed 
a broader band. The German mark became the anchor 
of the system, backed by its stability and the strength 
of its central bank (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 
1994). Nonetheless, German reunifi cation led to an 
expansionary fiscal policy which the Bundesbank 
tried to counteract by monetary austerity, resulting in 
an appreciation of the German mark and driving up 
interest rates in other EEC countries. Lastly, in response 
to a speculative onslaught on the pound sterling in 
September 1992, the British authorities raised interest 
rates by a substantial 15%. As this proved unsuccessful, 
however, Britain decided to withdraw from the band, 
along with Italy. Spain adjusted its parity twice, but 
remained in the system, as did France which merely 
raised interest rates. In August 1993, the EMS fl otation 
bands were widened to 15%.
As in the Mexican crisis two years later, this 
episode could not be explained by first-generation 
models and empirically refuted the Lawson Law: in 
both cases, the public sector was running a fi nancial 
surplus. Moreover, large current-account deficits 
induced exchange-rate crises occurring in Chile in the 
early 1980s, or in several Asian countries in the late 
1990s, even though such defi cits essentially refl ect an 
imbalance between private saving and investment.
The Mexican crisis (1994-1995) arose out of socio-
political uncertainty, in an economy suffering from a 
large current account deficit, gradual dollarization 
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through mexican Treasury bonds, and a domestic 
currency that was overvalued by about 25%. In 
December 1994, massive capital flight forced the 
fi nancial authorities to widen the fl otation band by 
15.2%, and almost immediately afterwards the Mexican 
peso was allowed to fl oat freely. 
The Mexican crisis propagated to other emerging 
economies, which authors such as Krugman (1999) 
explained as a contagion effect arising from imperfect 
information. This leads investors to classify several 
countries in a single category, irrespective of their 
specifi c macroeconomic features, and even without 
apparent trade links between them. Self-fulfilling 
expectations spread and were magnif ied among 
institutional investors, thus expanding the scale and 
scope of the crisis. 
This episode had different characteristics than 
the earlier Mexican crises. While the crises of 1976 
and 1982 were the result of public-fi nance defi cits, the 
1995 crisis stemmed from socio-political uncertainty 
in a weak economic framework, and bank lending to 
the private sector that was rendered excessive owing 
to problems of moral hazard and the operational 
ineffi ciency of recently privatized fi nancial institutions 
(1990). The latter displayed two distinctive features: 
entities had been acquired by economic agents that 
were not insiders (brokerage fi rms), and their valuation 
had been overstated. Moreover, fi nancial operations 
would be supervised by an obsolete National Banking 
and Securities Commission (CNBV), which lacked both 
suitable tools and staff. The conjunction of these factors 
and the implicit incentives created by privatization 
meant that within a few years the local banking system 
had a large proportion of non-performing loans in its 
portfolio (Frenkel, 2005). 
In 1993, credit risk peaked just as the economy 
was at a turning point in the business cycle: inadequate 
loan selection caused the non-performing portfolio to 
expand. In 1994, fi nancing extended to the public and 
private sectors grew by 19.7%, and 11.8% respectively 
in real terms, but this was the last expansionary year in 
the credit cycle. When interest rates rebounded a large 
proportion of bank loans became unpayable, making the 
overdue portfolio unrecoverable, and rendering most of 
the current portfolio doubtful. Borrowing and lending 
plummeted by -10.6% and -15.6% respectively. The 
absence of a reliable supervision system, in conjunction 
with accounting systems that were not standardized 
between different fi nancial entities, made it impossible 
to quantify the true magnitude of the banking crisis, 
but clearly revealed the feedback that exists between 
banking problems and the collapse of an exchange-
rate regime.
The Mexican crisis, together with that of the EMS, 
both of them set in a fi nancial liberalization process, 
fuelled a major debate in the specialist literature and 
gave rise to second-generation models inspired by the 
work of Obstfeld (1986). This was expanded on and 
modified by various authors such as Eichengreen, 
Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
Krugman (1996) and Obstfeld (1996).
The new literature makes it possible to explain the 
interaction between agents’ expectations and economic 
policy, in which government actions represent an optimal 
response to shocks. The public cost of maintaining a 
fi xed parity increases as expectations of a devaluation 
of the currency are generated, such that government 
liabilities become unstable, but conditional on the 
macroeconomic scenario or state of nature. The existence 
of nominal rigidity in the economy can partly explain 
why the government may face incentives to abandon its 
initial commitment to the fi xed parity. For example, a 
rigid labour market leads to high levels of unemployment 
which can be reduced by an expansionary monetary 
policy that creates infl ationary pressures and erodes the 
real wage (Díaz Mier and Hinarejos, 2006).
An example of a second-generation model is that 
of Obstfeld (1996), in which the initial assumption is 
that when there is uncertainty about the future trend of 
the exchange rate, the government introduces parity-
defending measures that involve implicit costs such 
as job losses. The public decision to devalue is based 
on minimizing a loss function that relates the costs of 
defending the exchange rate, expressed either in terms 
of lower output or job losses, to the cost of currency 
devaluation in terms of higher infl ation. 
 L=(y–y*)2+βε 2+c(ε) (7)
where y is actual output, y* is the government target, 
ε is the exchange-rate variation, and c(ε) is the cost to 
the government of changing the parity, associated with 
a loss of credibility. Output is determined through an 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve function:
 y= y~   +α(ε-εe)–µ (8)
where y~    is potential output, εe are local price 
expectations, ε, based on lagged information, and µ is 
an error term with zero mean. The assumption that the 
government’s GDP target, y*, is greater than potential 
output generates dynamic inconsistency giving rise 
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to multiple equilibria, each of which is a function 
of expectations of devaluation and the country’s 
macroeconomic balances. Hence, the latter, while not 
directly provoking the crisis, still have a signifi cant 
infl uence on their likelihood of occurrence. Of the 
former, if the cost of devaluation is low and output is 
sensitive to changes in the use of labour, devaluation 
aversion and the government’s credibility will decrease, 
which makes an exchange-rate crisis more likely 
(Obstfeld, 1996).
This class of model stresses the role of stock 
imbalances (e.g. public debt), and herd behaviour among 
economic agents (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996); in contrast, 
fl ow imbalances (the public-sector defi cit) are secondary. 
This theoretical framework makes it possible to 
understand the mechanisms through which expectations 
can fuel diffi culties on the foreign exchange market, or 
generate liquidity problems in the face of a crisis of 
confi dence, even if the economic program is viable in 
the long term. The more complex second-generation 
models take account of dynamic behaviour among 
the public and private sectors in the form of repetitive 
games in which each reacts to the other’s actions. 
Speculators take their decisions with full knowledge of 
the non-linear movements of the government and can 
force it to implement policies that are inconsistent with 
the exchange-rate regime, regardless of the situation 
in terms of macroeconomic fundamentals. From this 
standpoint, devaluation expectations are self-fulfi lling. 
The attack will happen provided there are incentives to 
speculate and mechanisms can be mutually coordinated 
(Welling, 2006).
Second-generation models focus on contagion 
effects; Masson (1999) provides various reasons why 
crises can occur in several countries contemporaneously. 
Firstly, there may be common factors in play, such 
as a rise in international interest rates. Another 
possibility, mentioned by Corsetti, Presenti and Proubissi 
(1999), is that collapse in one country undermines 
the macroeconomic fundamentals of another. Lastly, 
contemporaneous crises could refl ect factors that cannot 
be explained through economics, possibly because a 
change occurs in the market climate (pure contagion).
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence seems to 
show that in practice pure contagion seldom exists, and 
banking systems that are affected by shocks display prior 
vulnerability. Similarly, the effects that cause a crisis in 
an individual institution that threaten overall systemic 
stability are more likely in fragile fi nancial structures. 
As pointed out by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), since 
fi nancial liberalization, banking and monetary crises 
seem to be closely linked. Usually, the start of banking 
problems precede foreign-exchange crises.
In the midst of considerations of this type, the 
foreign exchange and fi nancial crisis of the Southeast 
Asian countries erupted in 1997, giving rise to another 
generation of models. 
IV
Third-generation models:
the Southeast Asian countries
The specifi cs of the Southeast Asian crisis revealed the 
limitations of the balance-of-payments crisis models 
that were in vogue at that time. The crisis erupted in 
1997, when the Central Bank of Thailand fl oated the 
baht, thereby triggering massive sales of the other 
Southeast Asian currencies and that of the Republic 
of Korea. The Philippines and Indonesia liberalized 
their foreign-exchange market, while the Republic of 
Korea widened the won fl otation band from 2.3% to 
10%, before eliminating the bands altogether. All of this 
contributed to a crisis of confi dence in the region and 
fuelled massive capital fl ight. Apart from describing 
the crisis, however, the aspect that is relevant to this 
article is its gestation process.
From the mid-1980s until 1990, the Southeast 
Asian economy grew at an average rate of 6% per year, 
fuelled by foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan, 
which in the second half of that decade amounted to 
US$15 billion (Agénor, Miller and others, 1999). Interest 
rates in the industrialized world in the early 1990s 
promoted speculative capital inflows into Southeast 
Asia, whose high yields, dollar-anchored exchange rates, 
fi nancial liberalization and favourable macroeconomic 
performance made it extremely attractive (IMF, 2007).
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But those same yields and their effects on the real 
exchange rate steadily undermined export competitiveness 
and curtailed lending to local enterprises. In the fi rst 
half of the 1990s, the Philippine peso appreciated by 
40%, and the ringgit, baht and rupee all rose by nearly 
20%. Thailand posted a large current account defi cit 
and Malaysia moved from surplus to defi cit. Capital 
fl owed into these countries partly in the form of loans, 
and from 1995 until one year before the crisis, short-
term obligations accounted for 58.5% of the total debt 
(García and Olivié, 1999).
In a setting involving foreign capital flows, 
excess leverage and deregulation, banks borrowed in 
foreign currency while lending in local currency, thus 
accentuating exchange-rate risk. 
They also faced a major disparity between 
borrowing and lending maturities, and loans for 
high-risk and unproductive investments such as real 
estate and shares. All of that fuelled an increase in 
the non-performing portfolio, which grew to 15% 
of the total portfolio in Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea and Malaysia even before the 
crisis, compounded by a real-estate and stock-market 
bubble that culminated in exchange-rate and fi nancial 
collapse across the region.
An analysis of the gestation of the Southeast 
Asian crisis shows that, like Mexico or the EMS, the 
countries in question were not suffering from public 
fi nance problems or loss of international reserves, thus 
contradicting the fi rst generation balance-of-payments 
crisis models. Second-generation models, however, 
also were unable to explain the Asian case in terms of 
the factors that triggered expectations of devaluation: 
there was no public defi cit or economic stagnation. In 
particular, doubts were raised as to the origin of the 
balance-of-payments pressures and their linkage with 
the fi nancial system, where the direction of causality 
was less clear and suggested a feedback process. 
Nonetheless, the current models did consider that 
the incremental cost of maintaining the parity could 
entail higher expectations of devaluation, as could 
also be said about currency appreciation, low returns 
on investment projects and the maturity structure of 
private-sector debt. The Asian countries had a number 
of structural shortcomings, but these would not have 
affected the rest of the economy without a feedback 
process between domestic problems, external shocks 
and expectations. Contagion may have helped propagate 
the Asian crisis, because highly dissimilar economies, 
such as the Philippines and the Republic of Korea, 
succumbed to speculative attacks.
These considerations were extended to the Mexican 
crisis of 1994, and gave rise to an entire literature on 
information problems in the banking system and their 
consequences in terms of moral hazard and adverse 
selection in fi nancial institutions’ asset portfolios (De 
Juan, 2005). 
This line of thought give rise to third-generation 
models, which actually share several elements in 
common with the previous approaches. Firstly, they 
draw on a number of arguments used in the initial 
models on exchange-rate crises, because in the presence 
of moral hazard a debt will ultimately be assumed by 
the government even if it originates in the private sector. 
Crisis in the foreign exchange market then arises from 
an implicit public defi cit which makes it necessary 
to abandon a fi xed exchange rate. This hypothesis is 
favoured by several authors such as McKinnon and Pill 
(1999) and Corsetti, Presenti and Proubissi (1999). 
This third class of models also draws on second-
generation ones by recognizing that government 
behaviour depends on the macroeconomic climate; but 
the difference is that the government reaction responds 
not only to the action of speculators but also to the 
trend of macroeconomic fundamentals. The existence 
of implicit guarantees and moral hazard is the basis of 
these new models for explaining the “games” played 
between the public and private sectors. 
A third-generation model par excellence is that of 
Corsetti, Presenti and Proubissi (1999). This assumes 
a small economy specializing in the production of 
a tradable good, Y, with a constant-returns-to-scale 
Cobb-Douglas production function, and a stochastic 
technology parameter, At, with two equiprobable 
values: (A+σ) or (A–σ). Capital markets are incomplete 
and segmented. A fraction, β, of domestic economic 
agents (the elite or ELI) has free access to capital 
markets, whereas the rest of the population, ROC 
(domestic agents not belonging to the elite), can only 
acquire domestic assets. 
Initial capital is f inanced through foreign 
borrowing; ELI obtains foreign credit, D, and lends 
K to foreign ELI at a constant interest rate of r. The 
budget constraint facing ELI is:






where W are the real wages of ELI, C its consumption, 
T its net tax payment, M its money holdings, P the 
domestic price level and εt the exchange rate. Labour 
incomes are the only source of income for ROC; and, 
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as there is no capital market enabling them to borrow 






The government implements fiscal policy and 
manages international reserves R. Prior to a crisis its 
budget is:
 Tt+(Mt–Mt-1/Pt )+(rεt /Pt )Rt= (εt/Pt )(Rt+1–Rt ) (11)
To take account of international arbitrage and 
fulfi l purchasing power parity, Pt = εt and adding the 
foregoing budget constraints, the following function is 
obtained for the current account:
 -(Dt+1–Rt+1)+(Dt–Rt)=Yt–r(Dt–Rt)–Ct–(Kt+1-Kt)  (12)
ELI is risk-neutral, and its inter-temporal preference 
rate is equivalent to the interest rate, r. Its expected 













s( / )  (13)
Each agent of the elite maximizes this expression 
with respect to capital and money holdings, subject 
to the respective budget constraint (equation 10). 
The optimal choice of capital equalizes its expected 
marginal return with the cost of funds. In this case, 
investment decisions affect net revenue, T ELI, in 
subsequent periods. 
ROC, unlike ELI, cannot trade assets across time, 
so its demand for money is inelastic with respect 





In this model, a fi nancial crisis arises when the 
liabilities of ELI exceed capital, and the essence of 
the treatment of moral hazard is that, once the crisis 
erupts, agents correctly assume that the government 
will support them, such that the optimal choice of 
capital depends on expectations relating to future taxes 
or transfers. 
As agents rationally anticipate this monetary 
support from the government in the event of a crisis, 
moral hazard can be modelled as a non-negative 
transfer, θ, contingent on the occurrence of A. If the 
realization is negative, Ã=A-σ, agents expect to receive 
public transfers equivalent to the difference between 
the non-performing portfolio and the cost of funds. 
In contrast, if the realization of the shock is positive 
(Ã=A+σ), nothing will be received.
It is easy to show that the desired level of capital, 
K, is greater than the effi ciency level, K, so there is 
excess investment:
 
K = a A+ / r
1/(1-a)
> K = a A / r
1/(1-a)
 (15) 
Moral hazard generates excess foreign borrowing, 
because, as all capital is leveraged, ELI has to increase 
its external liabilities to fi nance its excess investment. 
Unless it receives government support, ELI will cover 
losses with growing external borrowing. The total 
external debt, D, is also expressed as
 Dt+1=Kt+1+Ft+1 (16)
Where the level of capital is constant at K, and F 
is the cumulative level of external borrowing since 
the initial period (in the model this is also called 
“evergreening”): F will be greater the more serious 
the shock and excess capital. This model also shows 
that fi nancial liberalization magnifi es these effects. The 
private sector can refi nance its external debt provided 
reserves, R, exceed a certain threshold, γF, below which 
international creditors not only halt the fl ow of fresh 
funds, but also refuse to maintain existing debt. The 
authors represent this constraint as:
 Rtc+1 = γ Ftc+1     0< γ <1 (17) 
where tc is the initial period. When this constraint is 
breached, fi nancial crisis begins –ELI presents the bill 
to the government which supports it; and government 
solvency encounters the inter-temporal constraint. 
“Natural collapse” is defi ned as a situation in which 
the attack on the currency only occurs when F/R=γ, 
for which there are two scenarios. In one case, the 
government obtains tax revenues to avoid monetary 
issuance and foreign-exchange crisis; and in the other, 
the money supply must grow at an average positive 
rate, the steady-state demand for money is constant, 
and both prices and the exchange rate rise at a rate of 
µ. Although natural collapse seems to coincide with 
abandonment of the exchange-rate parity, this does 
not surprise economic agents who understand the 
dynamics of the debt and international reserves. Hence 
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natural collapse cannot be an equilibrium state under 
rational expectations, since in that case the parity would 
collapse at an earlier stage.
Third-generation models attempt to reconcile the 
two previous models by taking into account non-linear 
government behaviour, self-fulfilling expectations 
and the existence of multiple equilibria; but also 
incorporating innovative aspects such as implicit public 
guarantees, fi nancial fragility and asset imbalances 
that stem from problems relating to information and 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The interdependence 
between fi nancial and exchange-rate crises becomes 
important and shows the potential danger implicit in 
fragile and poorly regulated banking systems. 
V
Recent crises and third-generation models:
the case of Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina
The Mexican and Asian crises revealed the importance 
of the banking system in balance-of-payments crises. In 
the Asian case, fi nancial fragility preceded the monetary 
attack, and was one of its key motivations; whereas in 
Mexico, the direction of causality between the fi nancial 
and exchange-rate crisis was never entirely clear, 
because the banking system displayed serious problems 
prior to the parity adjustment, which the latter merely 
highlighted and aggravated. The simultaneous crises in 
Russia and Brazil, and a few years later in Turkey and 
Argentina, provides complementary evidence.
In the case of the Russian crisis (1997), in that 
year President Yeltsin had introduced tax reform, controls 
over monopolies and business cronyism, and a market-
based economic and fi nancial model that would enable 
the country to grow temporarily. Nonetheless, problems 
persisted in terms of corruption, lack of contractual and 
property rights, prevalence of oligarchies (in fi nancial 
conglomerates), and fragile banking and tax systems. 
Two external shocks triggered the exchange-rate 
collapse: a slide in oil and other commodity prices; and 
contagion from the Asian crisis, which triggered capital 
fl ight and stock market collapse. In late 1998, payments 
were suspended and the rouble was devalued. The 
setting for the Russian crisis was consistent with third-
generation models but also involved new elements, such 
as a lack of international fi nancial support, or problems 
in establishing a market system and strengthening 
institutions in transition countries that were almost 
“violently” immersed in globalization.
In the case of Brazil (1999), the crisis gestation 
process had aspects in common with those of Mexico 
in 1994. Following lengthy periods of high infl ation, in 
1994 Brazil implemented the Real Plan (a stabilization 
scheme anchored on the nominal exchange rate). 
It also promoted trade and financial liberalization 
and the restoration of public finances by reducing 
transfers to the municipalities and increasing income 
tax. Monetary policy became increasingly restrictive, 
and the real fl uctuated within periodically adjusted 
bands (1995-1999). The plan succeeded in stabilizing 
the economy, although the currency steadily became 
overvalued. The Russian crisis in 1998 had aggravated 
nervousness among investors regarding the stability of 
emerging countries; and, as capital fl ight gathered pace, 
widespread expectations of a devaluation took hold. 
This, compounded by budget adjustment problems and 
a loss of international reserves, made exchange-rate 
collapse imminent, forcing the Central Bank of Brazil 
to widen the band and then put the exchange rate into 
free fl oat. Within a few days, the currency had lost 
over 30% of its value. 
The crisis in Turkey (2001) also fi ts the exchange-
rate crisis models studied above. Its key feature was an 
effort to control the country’s large defi cit (12% of GDP 
in 2000) and public debt (about 90% of GDP in 2001). 
The implementation of fl otation bands in 1999, to anchor 
the infl ationary process, elicited heavy capital infl ows 
and a substantial increase in foreign currency debt held 
by the banking system. In early 2001, disagreements 
between the President and his Prime Minister increased 
tensions on fi nancial markets and triggered capital fl ight 
amounting to US$5 billion in 24 hours, along with a 
stock market crash, a large-scale banking crisis and the 
abandonment of the fi xed exchange rate. The Turkish 
lira lost 36% of its value in 2001.
Given its real and fi nancial dimensions and its 
impact in current economic literature, the Argentine 
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crisis in 2002 is, along with the Mexican episode 
of 1995, the most severe economic, exchange-rate, 
and financial collapse of the last few years. This 
was preceded, as in the majority of recent exchange-
rate crises, by large infl ows of foreign capital under 
pre-established exchange-rate regimes. As occurred 
in Brazil (1999), Mexico (1994) and Russia (1998), 
a previous stabilization plan based on the 1991 
Convertibility Law had enabled Argentina to shake off 
hyperinfl ation and overcome a diffi cult socioeconomic 
situation. As years passed, however, this became 
a straitjacket that restricted competitiveness and 
overvalued the Argentine peso,1 leading to a gradual 
decline in the population’s purchasing power. The 
strength of the dollar, depreciation of the Brazilian 
real, and the drop in agricultural prices fuelled the 
deterioration of the current account. The shocks and 
lack of competitiveness caused a deep recession in 
the country from 1999 onwards, which aggravated its 
fi scal problems still further by reducing tax revenues 
(IMF, 2005).
Although the causes of the Argentine crisis have 
been widely debated, there seems to be a consensus that 
it was the result of an interaction between elements of 
domestic fragility, in both real and fi nancial markets, 
and external shocks and self-fulfi lling expectations. 
This crisis is thus consistent with third-generation 
exchange-rate crisis models. 
Elements of domestic vulnerability included 
incompatibility between the exchange-rate regime and 
a lax fi scal policy, compounded by economic slowdown 
and an increasingly fragile banking system (Bustelo, 
2004). Another ingredient of the crisis, pointed out 
by Galiani, Heymann and Tommasi (2002), was that 
excessive private expenditure in the 1990s fuelled by 
“irrational” expectations –as seen earlier in countries 
such as Mexico– confused an upswing in the business 
cycle with a positive change of trend. Accordingly, the 
public and private sectors borrowed in uncovered foreign 
currencies (Caprio, Klingebiel and others, 2005).
With regard to external shocks, a key element 
was that the contraction in capital markets following 
1 In the context of our research it is worth asking whether or not 
this overvaluation of the Argentine peso, estimated at 20% by the 
IMF (2005), was perceived by economic agents. This is where the 
hypothesis of asymmetric information in the gestation of balance of 
payments crises becomes relevant.
the Russian crisis (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2002), 
with the interruption of IMF assistance changed 
perceptions and generated considerable nervousness 
among international investors, causing the flow of 
funds to emerging countries to dwindle. Although, as 
claimed by Haussman and Velasco (2002), Argentina 
suffered no more than other nations in the region from 
the contraction on international capital markets, the 
collapse was the outcome of a conjunction of its rigid 
exchange-rate regime, lack of fi scal discipline, and the 
vulnerability of a banking system immersed in a process 
of deregulation and “foreignization”, in an international 
setting of more constrained monetary fl ows.
Arriazu (2003) and Schenone (2007) mention 
additional pressure factors, including expectations that 
the exchange-rate regime would prove unsustainable; the 
international rise in the relative prices of nontradable 
goods, and social tensions caused by a deterioration of 
social welfare, which made the government unwilling 
to accept the conditions imposed by international 
organizations. In January 2002, the Convertibility Plan 
was abandoned, and Argentina entered a period of 
instability (Mussa, 2002). The country faced genuine 
economic, fi nancial and political collapse, since the 
“corralito” (a restriction imposed by the government 
to curb an imminent run on the banking system) and 
the “corralón” (which set limits on time deposit 
withdrawals) were perceived as a violation of depositors’ 
property rights, and, in conjunction with the collapse of 
the payments system, undermined the credibility of the 
fi nancial system and institutions (Ocampo, 2002).
The collapse of the payments system led to the 
proliferation of barter, fairs, and monetary issuance by 
organizations and provinces. Several banks announced 
their closure, and the government implemented 
measures to support others to stave off bankruptcy. 
The law provided for a scaled repayment of deposits, 
without taking account of the major devaluation that 
was on the horizon, thus setting off a rapid recovery 
process (Chudnovsky, López and Pupato, 2003).
77C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 5  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 8
THE RELATION BETWEEN FOREIGN-EXCHANGE AND BANKING CRISES IN EMERGING COUNTRIES:
INFORMATION AND EXPECTATIONS PROBLEMS  •  DANIEL SOTELSEK AND LILIANNE PAVÓN
Third-generation models are better at explaining the most 
recent crises but not their gestation. In fi rst-generation 
models, crisis was triggered by a sharp reduction in 
international reserves caused by the monetization of 
the public defi cit; and in second-generation models 
the key factor was a speculative attack fuelled by 
widespread negative expectations. Third-generation 
models suggest that the main cause of exchange-rate 
crises is excessive foreign borrowing by the fi nancial 
system stemming from incentives problems, and that 
the mechanism of collapse is similar to that described 
by second-generation models: asset imbalance (Calvo 
and Mendoza, 1996) or breach of a given borrowing 
threshold (Sargent and Wallace, 1981).
From an analytical standpoint, it is possible to 
describe a gestation process that shows, in a defi ned 
chronological order, the diversity of schemes whereby 
fi nancial systems and exchange-rate regimes are set 
up and operate. 
The seeds of crisis are sown in the upswing of 
the business cycle, where collective illusion sucks in 
resources from abroad, thereby exacerbating optimism 
and fuelling growth in consumption, investment and 
borrowing. In this phase, the local currency gradually 
appreciates, thus eroding the country’s competitiveness 
and raising credit risk. In a overheated economy, there 
are strong incentives for agents to take on excessive 
and even unknown risks, beyond the absorption 
capacity of their capital and explicit safety nets. The 
greatest risk also stems from an increasing degree of 
currency- and maturity-mismatch between assets and 
liabilities, which accentuates systemic vulnerability 
to any shock, thereby encouraging a speculative 
attack driven by the characteristic herd behaviour of 
institutional investors. 
Moreover, in a rapidly changing global environment 
such as the present one, emerging economies are subject 
to shocks (including corrections in fi nancial-asset, real-
estate or raw-materials prices, interest-rate fl uctuations, 
economic slowdown and socio-political instability) 
which can change the scenario and the expectations 
of economic agents possessing different levels of 
information. Once the country is hit by these shocks, 
the distortions in risk-taking incentives intensify as 
the non-performing portfolio eats into bank capital. As 
managers start to perceive their jobs at risk unless the 
business shows profi ts, risky transactions become more 
widespread. Banks also start to act more aggressively, 
particularly if they anticipate government support in the 
event of a crisis. This phase sees the start of a silent 
withdrawal of funds and increasing redistribution of 
risk by well-informed customers, thereby revealing the 
information asymmetries that exist between agents in 
the fi nancial system.
When the shock occurs, collective deception 
magnifies the crisis. Lack of vision can exacerbate 
adverse financial conditions, because just after the 
episode it is easy to imagine it occurring, which 
increases the subjective likelihood of it occurring way 
beyond its real probability. This results in heavy credit 
rationing, halting of investment and foreign credit, a 
“fl ight to quality” and an upturn in profi ts, which in 
turn heightens adverse selection in granting loans. This 
nervousness can lead to bank runs in the absence of an 
adequate safety net.
Nonetheless, as the safety net simultaneously 
enables already insolvent banks to continue operating, 
losses then become explicit and lead to a crisis of 
confidence which is reflected in the financial and 
foreign-exchange markets. Customers may fi nd access 
to their bank accounts restricted, and the dispute over 
the distribution of the losses enters the political domain. 
There are two symptoms that characterize the transition 
from the second phase to the third: the media start to 
warn of exorbitant interest rates and bank runs; and 
the authorities initiate an open debate on possible bank 
closures, mergers or acquisitions. Exchange-rate and 
fi nancial collapse is now a reality.
The gestation process described above clearly 
shows that foreign capital inflows exacerbate the 
business cycle in emerging countries, when market 
euphoria arising from a successful model is followed by 
a fl ight to quality. This provokes a massive withdrawal 
of foreign f inancing, largely caused by the herd 
behaviour of institutional investors worldwide, and even 
the denial of support from international organizations 
–precisely as predicted by second– and third-generation 
models of balance-of-payments crises.
VI
Gestation of a crisis from the economics
of information standpoint 
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This is particularly true when a liberalized but 
poorly regulated banking system, with moral hazard 
arising from unlimited safety nets, turns such capital 
infl ows into a surge of lending, which is almost inevitably 
followed by a credit crunch that further undermines the 
vulnerability of the banking sector (McKinnon and Pill, 
1999). The crisis thus combines a deterioration in certain 
domestic macroeconomic fundamentals with speculation 
and herd behaviour in the international fi nancial market 
(Bustelo, 2004; Hale and Arteta, 2007).
VII
The creation of “rational”
inter-temporal expectations
The foregoing analysis confi rms the claim made by 
Herring (1998) that a prolonged period of calm usually 
precedes major shocks that trigger exchange-rate and 
fi nancial crises. Although, once the shock happens, it 
becomes clear that the agents involved had taken on 
excessive risk, the important thing is to understand why. 
There seem to be two possible answers: either agents 
underestimated the likelihood of the shock occurring; 
or else they perceived it correctly but still overexposed 
themselves to risk, because they considered it profi table 
to do so. 
The profitability of higher risk is common in 
banking crises and basically refl ects certainty among 
the customers and managers of banks that government 
support will be forthcoming. In other words, unlimited 
safety nets promote moral hazard and erode the 
soundness of the system, by raising the privately 
optimal level of risk above the socially optimal level. 
Underestimating the likelihood of a shock depends 
on an ability to calibrate the corresponding probability. 
This is a function of the frequency of the shocks, 
compared to the frequency of changes in the structure 
of the underlying causality, together with the level of 
understanding of the structure of that causality. 
Additional elements (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1982) can show that in decision-making situations, 
subjective probabilities are formulated on the basis 
of the ease with which an individual can visualize 
the event in question. If the subjective probability of 
a crisis decreases, even when the real probabilities 
remain constant or increase, economic agents assume 
greater risk exposure and therefore increase their 
vulnerability. 
This lack of vision propagates itself, because risk 
exposure systems are established on a relative basis and 
provoke the herd behaviour seen among institutional 
investors. Keynes foresaw this situation clearly when 
he stated that “a sound banker is not one who foresees 
danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, 
is ruined in a conventional and orthodox way along 
with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him.” 
(Keynes, 1931, p. 176). 
The second reason that people assign a low 
probability to the occurrence of a negative event is 
that people have unrealistically high expectations of 
themselves and their country. As described by Naranjo 
(1996, p.8), there is an ubiquitous propensity towards 
unfounded optimism based on human biological 
characteristics.
Another related cause of errors of appreciation is 
cognitive dissonance, i.e. a tendency to form judgments 
based on wishes and in defi ance of the evidence. From 
the economic standpoint, people have preferences for 
their economic expectations in the macroeconomic 
environment; they have some power to change them; 
and those chosen persist. 
Whatever the cause, this lack of vision which 
some authors refer to as “disaster myopia” (Herring, 
1998) and others call “collective illusion”, also affects 
the government and fi nancial system regulators who 
relax just when they should be taking steps to fi ght 
growing vulnerability: they suffer from the same 
perception bias as other economic agents. Institutional 
factors can strengthen collective illusion and excessive 
risk-taking. Argentina provided a clear example of the 
perverse effects of disaster myopia, for the crisis in 
that country was clearly exacerbated by the existence 
of collective illusion: most market participants did not 
have a contingency plan in the event of a collapse of the 
convertibility system, which was nonetheless feasible.
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This article has provided a brief theoretical and empirical 
review of recent balance-of-payments crises.
In the 1980s, in response to the evidence of 
those years, fi rst-generation models were developed 
that explained the crises in terms of government 
policies that were incompatible with the prevailing 
exchange-rate regime. Nonetheless, the crises in the 
European Monetary System (1992) and Mexico (1994) 
highlighted another factor triggering a speculative 
attack on the foreign-exchange market and the fact that 
this could still exist in conjunction with disciplined 
public fi nances: namely the generation of self-fulfi lling 
expectations in a setting of asymmetric information. 
They also demonstrated the presence of f inancial 
contagion fuelled at least partly by the herd behaviour 
of institutional investors. These two elements formed 
the core of second-generation models, which ignored 
the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country in 
question. Nonetheless, the specifi cs of the Southeast 
Asian crisis in the late 1990s, and the subsequent crises 
in Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina, suggested that 
there was interaction between the variables considered 
in the two types of model. 
The resulting third-generation models drew on 
elements of the initial models, because, particularly 
when moral hazard is in play, any debt in a country 
will ultimately become a public debt and sooner 
or later make the prevailing exchange-rate regime 
unsustainable. The new models also draw on their 
second-generation predecessors by highlighting the 
importance of expectations in the process by which 
crises develop and propagate. In fact, what makes these 
latter models valid is the fact that they are suffi ciently 
inclusive to incorporate relevant factors that have 
emerged from the most recent crisis episodes, such as 
interaction between real and domestic fi nancial fragility, 
the occurrence of a shock, and weaknesses in the design 
or execution of the banking regulation and supervision 
framework. All of this occurs in a setting of uncertainty 
and growing international fi nancial interaction. 
A deterioration in a country’s fi nancial situation 
usually precedes a balance-of-payments crisis. This 
deterioration stems from asymmetric information 
which, in the presence of unlimited safety nets and 
inadequate supervision and regulation, create adverse-
selection and moral-hazard problems. The fi nancial 
vulnerability that precedes a foreign-exchange-market 
crisis, specifi cally in the banking sector, stems from the 
profi tability of excessive risk-taking and the collective 
illusion displayed by economic agents. Nonetheless, the 
causality link is not one-way, because currency collapse 
further aggravates the deterioration of the banking 
situation, thus activating a vicious circle. A banking 
crisis generally occurs following the collapse of the 
currency, as a result of high interest rates that make 
the current portfolio doubtful or unrecoverable.
Thus, in the latest generation of balance-of-
payments crisis models, the government no longer 
bears exclusive responsibility for speculative attacks, 
and the blame must partly be transferred to the private 
sector in a setting of uncertainty. Crises arise from the 
system’s growing vulnerability prior to the occurrence 
of a major shock, which suggests that stability on 
the foreign exchange market is not guaranteed even 
in the presence of fi scal and monetary discipline –an 
implication that contradicts the fi rst-generation models. 
The complexity of the international schemes under which 
foreign-exchange crises are formed, makes it hard to 
generalize and design a single prevention model; but, if 
recent literature has contributed anything, it is by clearly 
showing that crises can be caused by a very wide variety 
of factors. The task that remains, therefore, is simply to 
strengthen regulation and supervision, in conjunction 
with appropriate management of economic policy 
that maintains consistency between stocks and fl ows, 
supported by stability on the foreign-exchange market.
Although the hypothesis of collective illusion 
is hard to detect ex ante, since it is impossible to 
demonstrate excessive exposure to the risk of shocks 
of unknown probability, it is feasible to identify the 
conditions that lead to it. These characteristics of 
expectations formation could be included in the new 
balance of payments mathematical models, with a lesser 
or greater degree of complexity. In their simplest version, 
it would be suffi cient to incorporate a component in 
the expectations formation function that assigned an 
intertemporal updating factor to the latest reported crisis 
episode, whether of the country in question, and/or the 
group of countries in the same category for the purposes 
of institutional investment (e.g. on the basis of the risk-
VIII
Final thoughts
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rating assigned by international agencies). This would 
bring theoretical rationality closer to human rationality 
which makes intertemporal perception errors.
In any event, to alleviate the risk of an exchange-
rate and fi nancial crisis, liberalization of the banking 
sector must clearly be accompanied by simultaneous 
construction of an adequate supervision and regulation 
system. Even then, unless progress is made in creating a 
new international fi nancial architecture, which in fact, is 
encountering increasing obstacles, emerging economies 
will remain vulnerable to fi nancial globalization in its 
current form. Accordingly, a consistent set of prevention 
measures need to be designed that are accessible to 
such countries, to stabilize their economies and protect 
them from international fi nancial volatility, but without 
ignoring capital infl ows –a diffi cult but essential task 
in this new millennium. Emerging economies cannot 
allow themselves to believe that financial stability 
is guaranteed, and once again fall into a collective 
illusion that has been so costly over the last 50 years 
and recently seems to have re-emerged in a number 
of countries in the region. This is reinforced by the 
alternative of Bretton Woods II and the phenomenon 
of “decoupling” stemming from the current crisis in 
the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States 
(Russell-Walling, 2008). Whether or not one is in 
favour of decoupling (i.e. making fi ner distinctions 
within categories), it is clear that this phenomenon 
also occurs among emerging economies, which today 
cannot be classified in a single category given the 
coexistence of some fast growing countries alongside 
others that are stagnating. Asia and Eastern Europe 
are the fastest-growing emerging regions, while Latin 
American indicators are generally disappointing in 
terms of global integration and economic growth, 
and several African countries have remained virtually 
excluded from modernity. In short, the category 
“emerging country” no longer says very much about 
the individual country in question.
(Original: Spanish)
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